Alan Garrow Didache |
the problem page
Attached is a Matthew's use of Luke bibliography. The quality of these contributions is, as might be expected, variable ...
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"During my PhD program at Dallas Seminary in the 2000s, I took a course on the Synoptic Problem taught by Harold Hoehner. Dr. Hoehner was a proponent of the Two Gospel Hypothesis and had been a personal friend of William Farmer, who had also taught in Dallas, at Perkins School of Theology in Southern Methodist University. I began Hoehner’s course favoring the Two Document Hypothesis, but the required readings showed me that there were reasons to question Q. I then started to wonder why it seemed that everyone who disbelieved in Q concluded that Luke must have used Matthew as a source. Why not the reverse? Then I came across the article by Ronald V. Huggins, “Matthean Posteriority: A Preliminary Proposal” (NovT 34 [1992], 1-22). I found it intriguing and persuasive." Rob went on to publish his PhD dissertation as: Robert K. MacEwen, Matthean Posteriority: An Exploration of Matthew’s Use of Mark and Luke as a Solution to the Synoptic Problem, LNTS 501; London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015. Here is the final paragraph of an RBL review by J Andrew Doole: In New Testament gospel studies, of course, the 2DH remains the democratically elected head of state. The leader of the opposition has recently been a post held securely by the FH, and it is refreshing to have a new case for a peripheral candidate. MacEwen almost always comes down against the 2GH, whose position becomes all the more untenable. His criticism of his main rival, the FH, proves successful in many regards and should be taken seriously by anyone considering Lukan familiarity with the Gospel of Matthew. At times one wonders if the arguments against the established 2DH are directed too specifically to the International Q Project and the idea of a reconstruction of Q. Nevertheless, MacEwen is surely correct in concluding, following a desideratum of an MPH commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, that the theory of Matthew’s familiarity with Luke “is worthy of more consideration than scholars have usually given it” (196). He has certainly convinced me. For most of my career I thought the Q hypothesis was the most convincing explanation of the material common to Matthew and Luke, though with the proviso that maybe Q was not a single source. When comparing parallel passages in these two Gospels in detail, I usually found that redactional changes to a common source by the respective evangelists explained satisfactorily their similarities and differences. What changed my mind about Q was the problem of envisaging what the source as a whole could have been like. Q is often said to have been a sayings collection, but in fact the Q material begins with a substantial amount of narrative and then seems to abandon narrative form in favour of sayings alone, sometimes with a brief narrative setting but often not. As a piece of literature, this is incoherent. I doubt if this problem can be solved by dividing Q into more than one source, though I would be open to a sustained argument along those lines if anyone were to develop one.
But the impression one gets from virtually all studies of the Synoptic problem is that the only viable alternative to Q is the Farrer hypothesis (Luke’s use of Matthew). I have never found that hypothesis credible. The major problem I see is the way that Luke would have had to rearrange the material he shares with Matthew. The common objection along these lines has been: Whywould Luke break up Matthew’s well structured and coherent discourses and scatter the material around his Gospel? Advocates of the Farrer hypothesis have devoted their defences to answering that question. But my problem is with the how, not the why. The process by which Luke would have had to select and arrange the material he takes from Matthew (which would have involved very carefully avoiding any Markan material in the context of this Matthean material) would have been extremely complex. Alan Garrow has shown this very convincingly, and it can only be appreciated by people who are willing to sit down with a synopsis and examine the parallel texts in detail. Francis Watson in his book Gospel Writing has now made the best available attempt to explain and account for Luke’s compositional procedure. I doubt if anyone could do better, but I ended reading it with the conclusion: This is unbelievably complex. It is also completely unparalleled in the way that other ancient authors worked with their sources. So I hung onto Q for longer than I would otherwise have done because I still found it more credible than Luke’s use of Matthew. But occasionally the question occurred to me: why has hardly anyone even attempted to explore the possibility that Matthew used Luke? It seemed like a solution that had never been tried, rather than one that been tried and found wanting (as one might say of the Griesbach hypothesis). I discovered that it had been proposed (by Christian Gottlob Wilke), back in the nineteenth century just when the Q hypothesis originated and became popular. At that stage most scholars adopted the latter, and the “Wilke hypothesis” (as we might have called it had anyone pursued it then) was forgotten. When eventually an alternative to Q again appeared on the scholarly horizon, it was the Farrer hypothesis. To me Matthew’s use of Luke had the obvious advantage of avoiding what I found incredible in the Farrer hypothesis. Though Matthew’s compositional procedures, if he took the “Q” material from Luke, would involve often conflating Luke with Mark (in the way that advocates of Q envisage him conflating Q with Mark), his procedures would be much less complex and difficult than those of Luke according to the Farrer hypothesis. A further consideration is that Q scholars, when judging whether Matthew or Luke preserved the more “primitive” form of a saying of Jesus, tend in a large majority of cases to decide for Luke. While the criteria for making these judgments are often not very secure, the overall impression that Luke has the earlier form of sayings he shares with Matthew should surely make it worth considering the hypothesis that Matthew took the “double tradition” material from Luke, rather than vice versa. (Since B. H. Streeter, the case for Q has standardly included the “alternating primitivity” of the “double tradition” material. In other words, sometimes Matthew, sometimes Luke preserves the more primitive form. This assertion seems to have obscured the fact that actually most scholars working with the Q hypothesis judge Luke to be more primitive far more often than they judge Matthew to be.) These considerations mean that, if one begins from the position of thinking that the Q hypothesis works rather well in many respects, as I do, but find it in the end unsatisfactory, as I do, then the more obvious of the other two principal possibilities must be Matthew’s use of Luke, not Luke’s use of Matthew. Many of the really good arguments for Q can also support Matthew’s use of Luke. Encouraged by the work of Robert MacEwen and Alan Garrow, who have devoted far more time and effort to exploring the “Matthean Posteriority” hypothesis (as MacEwen calls it) than I can spare, I decided I had sufficient reason to adopt it as a working hypothesis. The reason I am 99% convinced of Markan priority is that I have worked with it as a plausible hypothesis throughout my career and have always found it made good sense of the data. I have now made a start to working with Matthew’s use of Luke as a working hypothesis and so far it seems to me to doing well. The main reason the Synoptic Problem is difficult is that it involves working on both macro- and micro-levels. In other words, a hypothesis must give a plausible account of what an evangelist is doing with his sources overall and why he should be doing it, but it must also meet the test of explaining the precise similarities and differences between the parallel texts of each Gospel in each pericope. Probably this is a reason why so few people have so far taken “the road less travelled” – Matthew’s use of Luke. At SBL Denver 2018, Mark Goodacre will set out what he sees as the weakest points in the case for Matthew's use of Luke. If I were present I would like to ask him what he sees as the weakest point in the case for Luke's use of Matthew (the Farrer Hypothesis). This type of question is often worth asking of seasoned specialists - because they are usually experts in where their favoured hypothesis is weakest as well as where it is strong. (I will ask the same question of a couple of supporters of Matthew's use of Luke later in this series).
I suspect most scholars would say that the biggest problem for the Farrer Hypothesis is that it requires Luke to treat Matthew in ways that are uniquely complicated (cf. upcoming posts in this series). Not only is Luke's supposed treatment of Matthew unlike that of any other ancient author, it is also generally unlike Luke's treatment of Mark. While evaluating Goodacre's objections to Matthew's use of Luke it might be worth asking: How do these objections compare with the biggest problem with the Farrer Hypothesis? Are they in the same league? ------------------------ Mark was kind enough to respond to my question via Facebook: "Thanks Alan. I don't think the Farrer Theory has any weak points. If it did, I wouldn't have advocated it and would instead have advocated for a different hypothesis that lacked weak points." This response is, however, problematic for two reasons: 1) There is good evidence to suggest that Goodacre did not give serious attention to the possibility that Matthew might have used Luke until after cementing his reputation as a leading advocate of the Farrer Hypothesis. This much is suggested by the remark in The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze (2001, p. 108): 'The theory that Matthew has read Luke ... is rarely put forward by sensible scholars and will not be considered here.' Commenting on this statement in more recent debate Goodacre has explained that he was merely reflecting the state of research at the time. It seems reasonable to suspect, therefore, that this statement also reflects the state of his own research at the time. 2) In his first book on the subject, Goulder and the Gospels (1996), Goodacre notes weaknesses, as well as strengths, in the Farrer Hypothesis. 2018 year saw the publication of Gospel Interpretation and the Q-Hypothesis edited by Mogens Müller and Heike Omerzu (LNTS, Bloomsbury). This represents selected output from a conference held in Roskilde, Denmark in 2015 - at which a high proportion of the best, currently active, Synoptic Problem specialist were present. The volume is striking in two respects. First, every contributor is confident that Mark is the first of the three Synoptic Gospels. Second, it is remarkable how often contributors state something along the lines of: 'the Synoptic Problem is not yet solved'. This state of affairs is worth reflecting upon. If we are confident that Mark was first, then this leaves three possible (simple) solutions: 1) Matthew used Luke 2) Luke used Matthew 3) Matthew and Luke independently used Q If, after decades of sustained enquiry, we continue to suspect that options 2) and 3) don't fully solve the Problem, then it follows that option 1) might, after all, be correct. So, if you are very confident that Mark is the first Gospel, while also suspecting that the Synoptic Problem has not yet been solved (by the mainstream hypotheses), then may I encourage you to consider option 1): Matthew used Luke?
This year's annual meeting of the SBL/AAR sees an important development in the study of the Synoptic Problem: for the first time in a long time at SBL a 'new' solution to the Problem will come under the scrutiny of a major specialist scholar. Prof Mark Goodacre will present a paper: 'Why not Matthew's use of Luke?' (see abstract below). To mark this occasion I've created a series of twenty-four blog posts - one for every day in the run-up to the session. If you plan to attend SBL I hope that this series, which will include contributions by Evan Powell (creator of the $1,000 Challenge), Rob MacEwen, Erik Aurelius and Richard Bauckham, will whet your appetite for what should be a lively session. If, like me, you are unable to attend this year's SBL, then I hope these posts will provide a means of keeping in touch with this potentially important debate. Why Not Matthew's Use of Luke?
My presentation began by noting that, hidden within the $1,000 Challenge, was a rather special moment. This moment occurred when Bart Ehrman (rightly) observed that there was 'no one better to respond' to Garrow’s theory than Mark Goodacre. This allows the observation that Goodacre is the best person to find the worst flaw in Garrow’s theory. It follows, therefore, that if the worst flaw he identifies in the Matthew Conflator Hypothesis (MCH) is not a flaw, then the MCH solves the Synoptic Problem (SP). This section of the argument is covered in the following 9 minute video: My next move was to point out, for purposes of comparison, two major flaws in the mainstream hypotheses. The major problem I noted for the Two Document Hypothesis (2DH) is that it relies on the foundational premise that Luke could not know Matthew and that Matthew could not know Luke. Most scholars generally pay lip service to the second part of this requirement but, in reality, they very rarely give it any attention. And, so long as we are without a good reason why Matthew could not have used Luke, the 2DH is logically illegitimate. If, in the course of our discussion a good reason why Matthew could not have used Luke emerges, then all will be well. In the meantime, however, this fundamental weakness remains. The flaw I identified in the Farrer Hypothesis (FH) was that, under this hypothesis, Luke rather rarely treats Mark in the way that, under this hypothesis, he is required to treat Matthew. Indeed, Luke treats Mark in a way that is entirely conventional, but, under the FH, Luke is required to treat Matthew in ways that are exceptionally physically challenging and historical unprecedented. [A more detailed presentation of this argument is set out in Video 3/5: of my main presentation of the MCH.] A briefer summary of the flaws in the 2DH and FH are set out in the following 4 minute video. I then moved on to consider the flaw that Mark Goodacre identified in the MCH in the course of the $1,000 Challenge. Goodacre’s criticism had focused on my suggestion that high levels of verbatim agreement between Matthew and Luke are best explained by Matthew copying Luke directly, while low levels of agreement are the product of Matthew conflating Luke with another source. I conceded Goodacre’s point on both counts. I noted that it is, of course, always possible that low levels of agreement may simply be the product of Matthew’s own creative contribution when handling Luke. And, that if Matthew should happen to conflate Luke and Mark where Mark has little to add to what Luke has to offer, then the result is likely to include passages where Matthew and Luke agree very closely. What I maintained, however, was that (in each of the periscopes under scrutiny in the Challenge) Matthew consistently behaves precisely as the MCH predicts – conflating related passages of Mark and Luke. Consequently, I moved to suggest that the ‘flaw’ Goodacre identified in the course of the Challenge was a problem in the wording of my presentation, not a flaw in the underlying model. This discussion is set out in the following 12 minute video: The central thrust of my presentation, as a whole, was to point out that scholars have assumed there must be some good reason why Matthew could not have used Luke - but without actually knowing what that reason might be. This is why Mark Goodacre's involvement is so important. Goodacre, because of his extensive and widely respected expertise, can be relied upon to find the most substantial problem with Matthew's use of Luke. It will be significant, therefore, if the worst problem he can identify turns out to be an insubstantial one. Mark Goodacre's response fell into three sections: 1) A reassertion of the presence of cases where there are high levels of verbatim agreement between Matthew and Luke – even when Matthew has access to another related source. 2) A defense of the suggestion that Luke (under the Farrer Hypothesis) uses Matthew as he also uses Mark. 3) Three reasons why Matthew could not have used Luke. The structure of this response confirmed what might already have been suspected: the debate over the wording of Garrow’s analysis of high and low agreement passages has no impact on the question of whether Matthew could, or could not, have used Luke. This latter issue being reserved for the third section of the response. In section 2) Goodacre pointed out occasions when Luke’s treatment of Matthew (under the FH) is of a kind with Luke’s treatment of Mark. The difficulty here, however, is one of scale. Luke is required to repeatedly and extensively use Matthew in ways that are inconsistent with his treatment of Mark. In section 3) Goodacre moved on to offering specific reasons why Matthew could not have used Luke. This section appeared to offer a preview of a paper for SBL Denver, 2018, 'Why not Mattthew's Use of Luke?' the abstract of which reads: A recent resurgence in support for Matthean Posteriority (Alan Garrow; Rob MacEwen) builds on the secure footing of Marcan Priority alongside growing skepticism about Q. Could it be that advocates of the Farrer Theory have the direction of dependence wrong, and that Matthew knew Luke? The case for Matthean Posteriority refreshes the discussion of the Synoptic Problem by providing a new and interesting challenge, but the case for Luke’s use of Matthew remains strong: (a) Matthew’s redactional fingerprints repeatedly appear in material he shares with Luke; (b) Luke often shows “fatigue” in his versions of double tradition material; (c) Luke betrays knowledge of Matthean literary structures; and (d) Matthew fails to include congenial Lucan details on politics, personnel, and geographical context. The difficulty with all these arguments is that they are reversible or inconclusive: a) ‘Matthew’s redactional fingerprints’ may indeed be original to Matthew and then occasionally copied by Luke. It is also possible, however, that Luke is the originator of a particular turn of phrase that Matthew then admires sufficiently to replicate on several occasions. b) It is possible that in, for example, the Parable of the Talents, Luke’s fatigue causes him to confuse Matthew’s tidy and logical parable. It is also possible, however, that Matthew observed Luke’s confused parable and determined to tidy it up. c) Luke may have been familiar with Matthew’s literary structures. It is also possible, however, that Matthew’s literary markers were, in the first instance, constructed out of raw materials provided by Mark and Luke – and then repeated throughout Matthew’s Gospel. d) Luke certainly does include many details of politics, personnel and geographical context that do not appear in Matthew. It is very difficult to argue, however, that Matthew should be required to include such details when writing a gospel with a very different agenda. Some time ago I provided a more detailed treatment of points a), b) and c) in a blog post entitled ‘What does Mark Goodacre think?’ Three main takeaways For me, this lively and highly enjoyable session highlighted three points in particular: 1) The flaw Goodacre identified in Garrow’s presentation during the $1,000 Challenge is easily corrected and does not impact the question of whether Matthew used Luke. 2) Goodacre’s defense of Luke’s treatment of Matthew remains incomplete. The Farrer Hypothesis requires Luke to treat Matthew in an extraordinarily complex fashion. By contrast, the Matthew Conflator Hypothesis requires Matthew to treat Luke in ways that are fully consistent with Matthew’s treatment of Mark (with the exception of the omissions: Matthew omits very little from Mark but must omit substantial sections of Luke). (For a consideration of these omissions see Video 4/5 in my main presentation of the MCH.) 3) Goodacre’s specific arguments against Matthew’s use of Luke are reversible and inconclusive. If these arguments are the most substantial that an expert of Mark Goodacre’s stature can assemble, then the case for Matthew’s use of Luke deserves very careful attention. Your own $1,000 bill In the course of the BNTC session I gave everyone present their own comedy $1,000 bill - featuring BH Streeter wearing a wry smile: On the reverse was an opportunity to express interest in a wider and more detailed debate between advocates of the 2DH, FH and MCH: If you would like to see such a debate, then please respond below - indicating where you'd like the debate to take place: at SBL, BNTC, or some other venue. When Evan Powell offered Bart Ehrman a $1,000 wager at the end of 2017 it looked like the Professor had nothing to lose. If he could find a flaw in my solution to the Synoptic Problem he won $1,000 – if he couldn’t find a flaw, and was prepared to say so, he also won $1,000 (for charity). As things turned out Bart received the $1,000 without having to do anything at all. A friendly colleague, Professor Goodacre, offered to take up the challenge on his behalf. Goodacre exposed a (rather easily corrected) weakness in my presentation and the money was duly paid without a quibble – thank you Evan! Everyone was a winner. Powell and Garrow got an increase in awareness of the case for Matthew’s use of Luke; Goodacre had the pleasure of helping out a friend; and Ehrman gained extra money for his charities. In the midst of all this fun and laughter, however, Bart took another gamble - he opted to swing big while swinging blind.
Let me explain. In the preamble to the $1,000 Challenge Bart was full of confidence. A ‘new’ solution to the Synoptic Problem, perhaps especially one presented via internet videos, could not possibly be correct. After all, generations of great minds had been applied to this classic conundrum and, surely, they had covered off every option a thousand times. Having endured the ongoing fire of scholarly inquiry one of the two mainstream solutions must, therefore, be approximately correct? Against such a background it makes sense to suggest that anyone properly schooled in the discipline should be able to see off any ‘new’ solution without difficulty. It was at this point that Evan proposed his $1,000 challenge: you have the training, you find the flaw. Ehrman declared himself tempted – but reluctant to spare the time to watch the 52-minutes of video. He was grateful, therefore, when Goodacre offered to bear this burden for him. Note that Ehrman had no reason to watch the videos; he self-confessedly didn’t have the time to do so and a scholar more than competent to dismiss them was now on the case. It is at this point that Ehrman took (what seems to me) an extraordinary gamble. On the night before publishing Goodacre’s critique he said: ‘I find Goodacre’s argument completely convincing’. When the critique was actually published he said: ‘I consider it a compelling response.’ Scholars might occasionally use the term ‘compelling’ to endorse a view – but ‘compelling’ combined with ‘completely convincing’ takes the personal endorsement to a different level. Recommending any position to this extent (even your own!) inevitably carries a certain amount of risk since, when dealing with ancient history, we never have all the data. In this case, however, Ehrman not only ignored the usual standards of scholarly caution, he did so while operating in the dark. That is to say, he hadn’t watched the videos in question, neither had he read the peer review articles on which they were based. Swinging this big in the dark is definitely a gamble. If the history of Synoptic Problem studies were actually as Ehrman appears to assume, then the risk involved should not, in reality, have been particularly great. The almost unbelievable reality is, however, that Synoptic Problem studies have, from the start, failed to observe the most basic principle of problem solving: consider all the options. Despite the relatively small range of theoretically viable solutions on offer, and despite the massive amounts of scholarly effort expended over more than a century, the main players have only ever considered two of the three main possibilities (among those who acknowledge Mark as the earliest of the three Synoptic Gospels). Confirmation of this is provided in my exchange with Mark Goodacre. Note the phrasing of the quotation at the centre of this discussion: "The theory that Matthew has read Luke … is rarely put forward by sensible scholars and will not be considered here" (The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze, 109). The implication is not merely that Matthew’s use of Luke has gone relatively unexplored but also that it is the scholars who perpetuate this lack of curiosity who should be regarded as the sensible ones! This attitude is so extraordinary it is hard to believe it is real. It really is real. And, that reality carries with it a potentially startling implication: it might just be that a simple solution to an infamous problem has been overlooked by generations of respected scholars - right up to the present day. Such an implication naturally requires a reaction - a reaction that might require a bit of a gamble. And so Goodacre and Ehrman (although they advocate competing Synoptic Problem hypotheses) elect to use their considerable combined authority to repel the threat. That is why, although you might not see precisely why Goodacre’s criticism of Garrow is so devastating, you are left with the clear impression that devastating is what it must be – Professor Goodacre has found a flaw, and Professor Ehrman (without reading Garrow) finds Goodacre’s criticism 'compelling' and ‘completely convincing’. The overall message is clear: you can be sure that there is nothing to see here, the status quo deserves to remain firmly in place. But playing this card carries an uncomfortable risk. What happens if others do watch/read Garrow and others like him and discover that the status quo, thus shored up for generations, has never been defensible? Sooner or later the discipline of Synoptic Problem studies will have to face up to the embarrassment of this whole misadventure. We’ve spent a colossal about of time, effort and money on ‘solutions’ that don’t resolve the data – without considering the possibility that an obvious third option might, after all, be more satisfying. We can face that embarrassment later or we can face it now. I say colour-up now. After all, everybody knows that to hue is Ehrman. More on the Synoptic Problem. I am grateful to Mark Goodacre for his engagement with my work on the Synoptic Problem. Mark has deservedly achieved the status of a trusted expert in the field of Synoptic Problem studies – to the extent that students, and scholars from other disciplines, naturally turn to him as an arbiter of the virtue, or otherwise, of new developments. Consequently, a question I have often been asked is: ‘What does Mark Goodacre think [about the possibility that Matthew used Luke]?’ Up until a few months ago there was little to offer in response (see an earlier blog post). More recently, however, Mark has provided an insight into his work in progress on this subject. Goodacre’s main objection to my proposal, as presented in his blog post ‘Garrow’s Flaw’, is that my hypothesis explains passages where Matthew and Luke are virtually identical as the product of Matthew’s direct copying Luke ‘without distraction’. He objects that this explanation is inadequate inasmuch as sometimes such ‘distraction’ is available in the form of related material in Mark’s Gospel. My response to this main point is published here. In the course of our discussion Mark also made a couple of seemingly more minor observations – to which I now, belatedly, turn. The first was on the subject of ‘unpicking’. I quote in full: Garrow adds some general criticisms of the Farrer theory, including the old chestnut about "unpicking", which dates back to F. Gerald Downing. I have little to add here to the excellent critiques by Ken Olson and Eric Eve on this issue, but I will say that no critic of the Farrer theory has yet successfully isolated a single occasion where an advocate of the Farrer theory uses the term that they consistently put in quotation marks. I generally try to avoid putting things in quotation marks that are not quotations, but I realize that practices vary. The use of quotations marks around ‘unpicking’ is not, I affirm, because this was term coined by any proponent of the Farrer Hypothesis. The quotation marks are merely intended to indicate that, in the absence of a suitable technical term, an everyday word has been used in a technical sense. The idea to be captured is essentially that of ‘the opposite of conflation’. That is to say that, under the Farrer Hypothesis, Luke is required to perform a task that, at a range of different levels of detail, is ‘the opposite of conflation’. Conflation is an operation performed by numerous author-compilers from the second century onwards. Individuals who perform this activity in reverse are a rarer breed. Thus far, Luke (as understood by the Farrer Hypothesis) appears the sole example. I come now to what I regard as the more serious issue – albeit one that always generates a smile. Towards the end of his post Mark calls foul on my use of one particular quotation: Garrow concludes with his favourite quotation from me, "The theory that Matthew has read Luke … is rarely put forward by sensible scholars and will not be considered here" (The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze, 109), where I was of course just describing the field at the time of writing, a description echoed by Garrow himself three years later, "“The possibility that Matthew directly depended on Luke’s Gospel has not been widely explored” (The Gospel of Matthew's Dependence on the Didache, 228 n. 10). This paragraph highlights what seems to me a really important issue: the mismatch between the actual activity of scholars and what ordinary people assume about the activity of scholars. Admitting the risk of caricature, here is how I would characterise the latter. The ordinary person assumes that scholars are intelligent and dispassionate individuals who, for example, when faced with a puzzle with three possible solutions, will explore and evaluate all three options. I suspect that most ordinary people would be taken aback to discover, therefore, what actually happened in the case of the study of the Synoptic Problem. Very broadly speaking, the first generation of scholars decided that, of the three main options available, option 3 was superior to option 2. The following generation of students then continued in their footsteps. Then, some decades later, another scholar called the dominance of option 3 into question. This caused a string of others to rise up in support of option 2. There then followed a decades-long, and still unresolved, debate over the relative virtues of option 2 and option 3. And, all the while, option 1 was left virtually untouched. As a result, Goodacre, when writing A Way Through the Maze, felt justified in setting option 1 outside the field of debate. He ignored it on the basis that others had ignored it before him. Such reasoning is, however, a little reminiscent of how bankers excused their creation of the 2008 financial crisis: everyone around them had acted with an identical recklessness!
Ordinary people who are interested in the Synoptic Problem (if it is possible to call them that) have a right to expect that all the main options have been properly evaluated by the most respected authorities. The embarrassing truth is that, up until now, this has never been the case. It is good to know that Mark Goodacre is now working on a fuller engagement with the possibility that Matthew used Luke. In future, attempts to resolve the Synoptic Problem without reference to this possibility should be recognised for what they are: not good enough. |
AuthorAlan Garrow is Vicar of St Peter's Harrogate and a member of SCIBS at the University of Sheffield. Archives
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